The Madhya Pradesh Shaskiya Sevak (Adhivarshiki-Ayu) Adhyadesh, 1967 (12 of 1967) is hereby repealed. 1
SCHEDULE [ See sections 2 and 3] Rules
1. (1) These rules may be called the Madhya Pradesh (Anivarya Seva Nivritti-Ayu) Niyam, 1967.
(2) They shall come into force with effect fr,,:,m the 15th December, 1967.
2. (1) The age of compulsory retirement cf Government servants other than Class IV Government serv,tnts shall be 258 years.
(2) The age of compulsory retirement of Class JV · Government servants shall be 60 years.
l. Published in M.P. Rajpatra (Asadharan) dated 23-12-1967 Page 3144.
2. Substituted by M.P. Act No. 9 of 1976.
R y s f;
f Rr. 3] The M.P. (Anivarya Seva Nivritti-Ayu) Niyam, 1967 1135 ',
3. Those Government Servants who have already attained the age of 058 years on the date mentioned in sub-rule ( 2) of rule 1 and are in service of the said date shall, as from the said date, be entitled to such leave as may be due for a period not exceeding 120 days and shall stand retired on the date next following 1he date of completion of such leave:
Provided that the duration of such leave shall, in no case, extend beyond the date of attainment of the age of 58 years.
COMMENTS Synopsis
(1) Order of compuli,ory retirement on payment of three month's salary, not bad.
{2) Correction 6f entry about age.
(3)
(4)
(5) Court's declaratory decree is not monetary decree.
Raising age of Superannuation.
Compulsory retirement.
{l) Order of compulsory retirement on payment of three month's salary, not bad. -It is argued that there was a man who took his reversion with ill grace, did not join on his substantive post for long seven years, went to the High Court four years after the passing of the said reversion order, deprived the State of his services in whatever capacity, and thereby exhibited lack of devo tion to duty, used intemperate and. offensive language towards the superior officer for which he was charge-sheeted and actually removed from service on that count If the Government took all these factors into consideration in taking a decision as to whether it would be in public interest to retain him after the age of 55 years, could that decision be called rna!a fide at all ? And after all, the petitioner was only promoted temporarily as Assistant Engineer. He bad no vested right to continue en the post and he was also not selected by Public Service Commission.
The High Court 0f Madhya Pradesh agreeing with the above argument of Government advocate held that the decision of the Government in compulsorily retiring the petitioner at the age of 55 years, could not be attack on the ground of 'ma/a fide'.
It was further argued by the petitioner that the order of retirement under the Rule could be effective only if the State Government simultaneously offered payment to him of his three month's salary. Unless she payment of an e-r.act amount accompanied the service of notice, the rder of compulsorily retirement would be bad. · In the case of the State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dinanath Roi, decided on 11th October, 1968 : 1969 Service Law Reporter 647 (SC) the relevant portion of the Rule for interpretation reads thus:
" .......... Provided that in the case of notice of the appointing authority t~e latter may substitute for the whole or part of this period of notice pay in peu t_hereof provided further that it shall be open to the appointing authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice or accept notice for a short period, without requiring the Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice."
Their Lordships construed the rule differently and observed:
1136 Madhya Pradesh Services Manual [ Rr. 3 "The rul~ does not s~y ~h~t the pa~ sho~ld be given in cash or by the cheque at the tune the notice is issued. knowrng the way the Government ue run, it_woul~ be difficult to ascribe this intention to the rule making author,ty.
':fhere 1s nt? uoubt}~at the Go~emml':nt ~crvant would be entitled to the pay in hen of notice but t111s would be m th;; ordmary course."
In the present case the language of the rule is akin to the language used in the Rule in Din([n([f/i Rai's Case. 1969 Ser. LR. 647 (SC) and we~would prefrr to construe the rule in the m~nner: it was done in Dinanath's case. The payms::nt contemplated by the Rule 1s neither payment to be made forthwith, simultane ously with the notice, nor wou\d the notice be effective only upon paymrnt being made. Payment cou!d follow m the ordmary course.
Even otherwise there was substantial compliance of the rule. The offer of Rs. 1770/- towards three month's salary, was made, presumbly, on the same day notice of compulsory retirement wa, served or soon thereafter. The petition does not disclose the date of service of notice. The grievance of the petitioner is that the salary offered was calculated on the basis, as if the petitioner was stopped at the Efficiency Bar. According to him, the question of crossing the Competent authority had to consider the question prior to or on the date the petitioner became entitled to it and that date was L3.1969. If he was not considered on that date for any reason whatsoever, it would be presumed, ho says, that the competent authority had no objection to his crossing the efficiency bar. · The High Court held that the petitioner cannot claim the sanction to cross the Efficiency Bar simply because he had retired. The sanction could be given or withheld or even after his retirement. If it was given, he could claim benefits eve:1 though retired. If it was withheld, he did not lose anything, because he bad already stopped at that stage. It was. therefore held that no punishment inflicted. U.K. Narayanan Vs. State of 1'rfadhya Pradesh and others.
1975 M.P.L.J. 404: !975 J.L.J. 760.
(2) Couection of entry about age.--The facts of the case are that in the year 1957 when for the first time after the reorganisation of States, the petitioner was called upon by the Settlement Officer ro disclose his date of birth. The year 1917 mentioned in llta: Service Book did not seem proper record as the date and the month of the petitioner's birth were not mentioned and the Service Book in<licated nothing to show that the entry was verified with reference to any confirmatory documentary evidence like the matriculation certificate or the Municipal Bir!h certificate. The petitioner produced the matriculation certi!lcate and entered the date of birth as 8th April, 1915, not with an idea of creating conflict, nor there is reason to believe that the entry was made on the insistence of Shri RL Gupta. Presumably he made the entry having reason t0 believe that the same shall be acted upon. Whatever be the re,1l intention in the mind of the petitioner, any reasonable man would accept the declaration to be true and scton act on it.
A duty was cast upon the petitioner to disclose his date of birth along with confirmatory evidence He chose to produce the matriculation certificate.
He entered the date as shown therein without protest. He was therefore debarred from producing the horoscope instead and asserting that the real date of birth was 13th Shukla Samva1, 1974 equivalent to 20th August, 1917. He could have agitated the issue then and get the decision on the question of his date of birth.
He has come to the High Court thirteen years after when the Government has chosen to act on his own admission , they gave him extension of service for a year and retired. him with effect from 22nd April, 1971.
...
\ - Rr. 3] The M.P. (Anivarya Seva Nivritti-Ayu) Niyam, 1967 1D7 It was held that the petitioner was guiity of acquiescence. He ac?epted_ the date of birth a~ 8th April, 1915. The case also attracts the doctrme ot estoppel by negligence. The petitioner allowed the two entries to continue and thereby led the Government to choose the entry which prima facir:. appeared genuine and had the support of confirmatory evidence. The petitioner cannot now turn round and say that he has been prejudiced. He should have taken steps to get one of the entries prejudicial to him scored out. He had permitted them to continue and the Government could legitimately act on the entry which was supported by the petitioner's matriculation certificate. It wr.s customary with the Government to rely on the matriculation certificate mostly, for purpose of d~te of birth. The petitioner's n_egligence lay in permitting !he two entr_ies_ to contmue, and the latter entry in particular to be construed as his own adm1ss1011 in the matter of date of birth.
Further it was held that the petitioner was guilty of supression and mis statement of facts inasmuch as he did not disclose initially that he had himself entered in Part II of his Service Book the 8th April, 1915, to be his date of birth. He also did not speak about the declaration he had submitted in February,
1960. If he was force to make the entry as he later contended, that would be a disputed question of facts on which the High Court would not go in evidence.
In so far as the admission in the declaration of February, 1960 is concerned, there is no such plea of undue influence or coercion or misapprehension. Prima facie, however, the two documents were held to be voluntarily executed. M akra• dhwraj Singh v.~. State of Madhya Pradesh and another. 1974 M.P.L.J. 31.
(3) Court's declaratory decree is not monetary decree.-In Civil Appeal No.
670 of 1965 l;N. Saxena Vs. State of M.P., decided on the 3Cth January, 1967, the Supreme "Court held that retirement of a Government servarit after he attains the age of 55 years, on three month's notice on the basis of the General Administration Department Memorandum No. 433-258-I (iii) 763 dated the 28th February, 1963 is invalid in since the said memorandum was merely an execu tive dire;;tio~1~and not a rule governing the conditions of service of Government servants. The decision affected a large number of retirements ordered on the basis of the aforesaid memorandum and involved considerable financial burden on the State Exchequer by way of payment of arrears. There were likely to be other complications regarding continuance in service etc.
Therefore after the decision of th::it appeal the Governor had promulgated an Ordinance which was replaced on April 20, 1963 hy the M.P. Shaskiya Sevak A_nivarya Sevaniviriti ka Vidhimanyatakaran Vidyayak Takaram Vidyeyak Adhi myam, 1967 (5 of 1967) validating the retirement of certain Government servants, including that of appellant, despite the jugment of Supreme Court.
By virtue of this Act, the State is vested with a right not to pay the dues of appellant from the date of his retirement (December 3, 1963) onwards. In effect this Act has made provisions of Compulsorily Retirement Rules, 1965 applicable from March 1, 1963.
Tbe appellant again moved the High Court 0hallenging the validity of the Act which was dismissed so an appeal was filed to the Supreme Court.
It is argued on behalf of the appellant; (i) that a right of property being a judgment-debt, protected by Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution, had been created by the Supreme Court's Decree dated 30th January, 1967 in favour of the appellant· and against the State. Since the impugned Act to effect, seeks to expropriate the appellant of that right without providing for any compensation it is ultra vires Article 31 (2) of the Constitution;
1138 Madhya Pradesh Services M:a,1rnal
(ii) That the impugned Act is ultra vires the Constitution inasmuch as it seeks to validate the retirement of the appellant and other like him by chang ing their service conditions with retrospective dfect. In so so doing, the State legislature has over-stepped the limits of legislative powers conferred on it by Article 309 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the State of Mvsore Vs. Padamabhacharya etc. (1966) 2 SCR 494. , . (iii) that the impugned Act, encroaches upon the judicial field inasmuch at it overrules and make unenforceable the decision elated 30th January, 1967 in Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No 670 of 1963, and in so doing, it off ends Articles 141, l 42 and 144 of the Consitution ;
(iv) Even if the impugned Act is valid, clauses ( b) and ( c) of section 5 of the Act, on a proper construction, do not vacate 1he decree ofthe Supreme ~ourt, requiring the respondent to the appellant the peen niary benefits result mg from the success of his earlier appeal (CAA. 670/65) in Supreme Court.
Clause (b) of section 5 merely bars the maintenance or continuation of any proceeding hr any amount as payment, towards salary. The appellant is not seeking to maintain or continue any execution proceeding in Court, for the recovery of any amount toward;; salary, the decree being a declaratory one, None of these contentions were held to be tenable .
. o? perusal of the Supreme Court decree referred to above would show that 1~ 1s not a money decree, raising a judgment-debt. It is a declaratory decr_ee de~l~rmg ,that the respondent's order dated September 11, 1963, compulsorily retmng tne appellant was invalid, and consequently the appellant would be deemed to· have continued in service.: till he attained the age of 58 years.
The fmther declaration that he will be- entitled to such benefits as may accrue to ~i!11 by virtue of the succes'> of the writ petition was only incid~ntal_or anc!lhary to the main relief and will faU or stand with the same. This being the position the decree did not create an indefeasible right of property in favour of the appellant.
The distinction between a 'leo-islative and a 'judicial act is well known, though in some specific instance the line which separates one category from the other may not be easily discernible. Adjudication of the parties according to la~ enacted by the legislature is a judicial function. In the performance of this function the court interprets and gives effect to the intent and man date of the legis!atnre as embodied in the statute. On the other hand, it is fo_r the legislature to lay down the law prescribing norms of conduct which will govern parties and transactions and to require and to give effect to that law.
. It was therefore, held that in enacting the impugned provisions, the leg islature _ha~ :iot exceeded the limits of its legislative powers nor encroached on the Judicial field. I. N. Saksena Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh. 1976 U.J. (SC) 223. .
In Piare Dusada and others Vs. The King Emperor 1944 F.C.R. 61, 1;he Governor General by Ordinance repealed the Special Criminal Courts Ordin ance TI of 1942. There was a provision in the rrncalina ordinance for con firma_tion and continuance of sentences of Spe~ial c~urts and retrial of pendrng cases. The appellant therein had been convicted and sentenced by Special Criminal Court which was held have to jurisdiction to try the case by an order of a court Section 3 (l) of the Special Criminal Courts (Repeal) Or- Rr. J] The M.P. (Anivarya Seva 'Nivritti-Ayu) Niyam, 196'7 1139 dinance 1943 conferred validity and full effectiveness on sentences passed by Special' Criminal Courts by conferring jurisdiction on them with retrospective effect. The Federal Court held that by promulgating and repealing Ordinance of 1943 the legislative authority had not attempted to do indirectly what it could n~t do directly or to exercise judicial power in the guise of legislation It was furth0r, held that the Ordinance was not invalid on the ground that the kgishtive authority had validated by respective legislation proceedings held in courts which were void for want of jurisdiction as there was nothing in the Indian Constitution which precluded legislative from doing so.
(4) Raising the age of superannuation.-In !he case of Batahari .fena Vs.
The State of Orissa. A LR. 1971 S.C. 1516, rehance was placed on certain observations in the tkcisiou or the supreme Court in Gurdev Singh Sindhu Vs. State of Punjab. (1964) SCR 587 : A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1585. There the Supreme Court struck down Article 9.1 of the Pepsu Service Regulations under which the Government sought to retain an absolute right to retire any Govern ment servant after he had completed ten years qualifying service without giving any reason. In that case the petitioner who had been appointed as an Assis tant Superintendent of Police in the erstwhile Patiala State on February 4, 1942 and confirmed in that rank on the regular vacancy after undergoing practical district training courses, and after promotion to the rank of Superin~ tendent of Police in an, officiating capacity in February 1950 in the said State of Pepsu, was asked to show cause by notice dated 25th March 1963 as to why he ,should not be compulsorily retired. The petitioner complained that the notic;: issued to him was invalid on the ground that the article on which it was based was itself ultra vires and inoperative and only question before the Court was whether the impugned article was shown to be constitu tioually invalid. Referring to Satislz Chand,vrr Anand Vs. The Union of India 1953 SCR 585 : A.LR. 1953 SC, 250, and .o certain dicta of the majority Judges in Moti Ram Deka Vs. General ,Manager, North East Frontier Railway.
A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 600 : (1964) 5 SCR 683, the Supreme Court observed by way of explanation that : " .......... the majority judgment took the precaution of adding a note of caution that if a rule of compulsory rctiremf-.nt purported to give authority to the Government to tern1Inate the services of a permanent public servant at a very early stage of his career the question about the vali dity of such a rule may have to be examined. That is bow in accepting \the view that a rnle of compu1&0ry retirement can be treated as valid and as _ constituting ar 0xception to the General rule that the terminat!l).J. of the ser~ vices of a permanL · !111blic servant would amount to his removal u·, , r '311
(2), the Supreme Cuurt added a r;der and made it perfectly clr.ar that if the minimum period of service which was prescribed by the relevam rules UJJ1teld by the earlier decisions was 25 years, it could not be reasonably reduced in that behalf. In other words, the majority judgment indicates that what indi cates what influenced the decision was the fact that a fairly large number of years !lad been prescribed by the rule of compulsory refaement as constituting the minimum period of service after which alone the said)ule could be invoked.
The Court further observed foat that the safeguards which Article 311
(2) affords to permanent public servants is no more than this that in case it is intended to dismiss, remove or reduce them in rank a reasonable opportunity should be given to them of showing against the action proposed to be taken in regard to them. A claim for security to tenure does not mean security to tenure for dish, aest, corrupt, or inefficient public servants. The ~]aim merely insists that before th,;:y are removed, the permanent public servants should be given an opportunity to meet the charge on which they are sought to be re- 1140 Madhya Pradesh Service Manual I Rr. 3 moved. Therefore, it seems that only two exceptions can be treated a, valid in <lea ling with the scope and effect of the protection afforded by Arti. ·le 31 l
(2), if a permanent public servant is asked to retire on the ground that he has reached the age of superannuation which has been reasonably fixed, .\rticlc 311 (1) does not apply, because such retirement is neither dismissal nor r, nioval of the pablic &orvants. If a permanent public servant is compulsorily retired under the rule.c; which prescribe the normal age of superannuation and provide for a reasCJnably lo 1g period of qualified service artor which alone comr:,Jlsory retirement can b0 ordered, that again may not amount to dismissal or r,~moval under Article 3 l l (2) 1111inly because that is the effect of a long series of de cisions of Supreme Court. But where while reserving the power to the St ate to compulsorily retire a permanent public servant, a rule is framed pre~:cribing a proper age of superannuation, and ano~her rule is added giving the power to the State Lo compu!ss:>rily retire a public servant at the cud of 10 years of his service,. that c-annot, be treated as falling outside Article 311 (2). The termination of the ~ervice of a permanent pubJi,;: servant under such a rule though compulsory retirement, is, iu substance removal under Ariicle 311 ( 2)".
The above observations relied on the counsel do not help the appellant The above ob3ervations show that a rule which permits a Government to ask an officer to retire after an unreasonably short period of service must before the normal age of supernnuation would be hit by Article 31 l. They cannot apply when the period of qualifying scrrice mentioned in the rule is 11ot un reasonably shot and the normal age of supernuuation fixed is not unacc:ouu tably early. Before May 1%3 a Government servant in Government servant in Orissa had to retire on attaining the age of 55 y,,ars whether he had com pleted 30 years' qualifying service or not. The fact that the age of superannu ation was ra:,ed from 55 or 58 while Goverunent reserved to itself a right to ask any employee to retire at the age of 55 does nc~ violate t'...,ticle 311 (2).
Secondly the order did not cast any aspcr~ions or stigma on the 2ppellant which would attract Article: 31 I, A Government has a right to require the Governrnent servant t0 retire at the age of 55 without assigning any reason.
The fact that by the notificatiou of 5th February. 1964 certain guidelines were indicate<l lo the Heads of Departments iu considering whether ::i Gov,~rnment servant shoulJ continue in service beyond the case of 55 years, one of the •actors for consideration being lack of integrity, did not imply that a11y officer whose continuance in service was not advised lacked in integrity. Batahare Jena Vs. The Orissa. A.LR. S.C. 1516.
It ls well known that a law or st ... utory ruk should be so interpreted as to make it valid and not valid. If this cx,-ression 1s con fined to v, hat was argued before the High Court namely that it give:. power to the Government to allow a Government servant to remain in service even beyond the age of 55 years for s1)ecial reasons the rule will not be rendered invalid and its validity will noL be put in jeopardy. So conslrued it is apparent that the appel!ant could not have hecn retired compulsory under the Saurashtra Rules be,ore he had attained age of 55 years. By applying the Bombay rule his conditions of service were varied to his disadvantage because he could then be compul ~orily retired as soon as he attained the age of 50 years. Taklwrrarr Shivdattmy Jfankad VI'. State of Gujarat. A.T.R. l 770 S.C. 143.
(5) Compulsory retirement.--In il!oti Ram Deka Vs. General iHanager N.
1:·F. Railway Afaligaon Pend11. 1954 (5) S.C.R. 1964 L.C.R. !'i83: A.LR. 1?64 S.C. 600 one of the matters which came up for considerat1011 waq the eflcct of a service rule which permitted compulsory retirement ,,·ithout fi~ing the '· ' •"' Rr. 3-4 J The M.P. (Anivarya Seva Nivritti-Ayu) Niyarn, 1967 1141 minimum period of service after which the r!-lle could be invoked. According to the observations of Venkataram Ayyar J. 111 State of Bombay Vs. Saubhag chand Af. Joshi. 1958 S.C.R. 571 : A.LR. .1957 L.C. 892, the application of such a rule would be tantamount to _d isnussal r~n:oval ~mder Article 31 · (2) of the Constitution. There were certam other dec1s10ns or the Supreme Court which were relevant on this point viz. P. Balakotaiah Vs. Union of India. 1958 S.C.R. l052 : A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 232 and Dalip Singh Vs. State of Punjab. 1961- 1 S.C.R. 88: A.LR. 1960 S.C. 1305. All these decisions were considered in l'vfotiram Deka Vs. General Manager N.E F. Railways, A.LR. 1964 S.C. 600 and .
the true legal position was stated in the majority judgm~~1t at pa~e 726 of of S.C.R. and at page 617 of A.I.R. thm : ·' ...... We t111nk that 1f any rule permits the ~ppropria!e authority !o retire comp_ul_sorily a civil servant witho~1t imposing a hm1tatton m th:at b~hatf that such c!Vll ~erva'.1t should have put m a minimum period of service, tnat rule would be mvalld and the so-called retirement ordered under the said Rule would amount to removal of the civil servant within the meaning of Article 311 (2)".
In Gurdev Singh Sidhu Vs. State of Punjab. 1964 7 S.C.R. 587 : A.LR. 1964 S.C. 1585, it was pointed out that the only two exceptions to the protection afforded by Article 31 l (2) were, (l) where a permanent public seivant was asked to retire on the ground that he had reached the age of superannuation 'which was reasonably fixed ; (2) that he was compulsorily retired under the rule which prescribed the normal age of superaunation and provided a reasona• b!y long period of qualified service after which alone compulsory retirement could be valid. The basis on which this view has proceeded is that for efficient administration it is necessary that public servants should enjoy a sense of secu• rity of tenure and that the termination of service of a public servant under a rule which does not lay down a reasonably long period of qualified servlce is in substance remova, under Article 311 (2), The principle is that the ·rule relating to compulsory retirement of Government servant must not only ,·ontain the outside limit of superannuation but there must also be a provision for a reasonably long period of qualified service which must be indicated with suffi cient clarity: To gi".e. a~ example, if 5? years have been specified as the age of superannuation and 1f 1t 1s sought to ret1re the servant even before that period it should be provided in the rule that he could be retired after he has attained the age of 50 years or he has put in service for a period of 25 years It is well settled that a law or a statutory rule should be so interpreted , as to make it valid not invalid. It this expression is confined to what was argued <l·: , .. -before the High Court, namely that it , '.ves power to oovernment to allow a . Government servant to remain in service >L: beyond the age of 55 years · 'for special reasons the rule will not be rendered invalid aud its validity will not be put i7:1 jeopardy. So ?onstrued it is apparent that the appellant could not have been retired compulsorily under the Saurashtra Rules before he had attained the age of 55 years. By applying the Bombay rule his condition of service were varied to his disadvantage because he could then be compulsorily retired as soon as he attained the of 50 years As the previous approval of the Central Gover mcnt was not obtai1?ed. in accordance with the proviso to Section 115 (7) of the States Re-organisat10n Act, 1956, the Bombay Rule could not be. made applicable to the appellant. Takhetrary Shivdattary Mankad Vs. State of Gujarat A.LR. 1970 S.C. 143 : 1969 Ser. 572 : (1970) I S.C.A. 138 : 11 Guj. L.R. 325 :
(1970) I S.C.R. 244.
4. A Gov~rument ~crv,mt_rnay. be given extension of service beyond the age 5l:l years. su~Ject toh1s physical 1Jtne·,s and outstnnding quality of-his work but not ord111a;-1ly beyond the age of 60 years. · .... •z-z- 1142 Madhya Pr;odesh Services Manual 14-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 4, a Gov:ornment Servant who had been a freedJm fighter may, on production of a certificate in the form below and subject to his otherwise being fit t0 bJ continued in service. be uivc:n extemion of ~ervice beyond the age of 55 years for such period not exceeding the period for_ which such gove_rnment servan, v,cns in actual detention and/or imprisonment including the penod undergone as under rial in connection ,,vitll the freedom movement, subject to 1mtximum of Three years.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this rule "a freedom fighter'' me&n a Government servant who was detained and/or imprisoned on accoun:. of his political activities in connection with freedom move,ricnt during the period from 1919 to 1946.]
5. The Madhya Pradesh (Age of Compulsory Retirement) Rule&, 1966 are hereby repealed.
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MADHYA PRADESH J\DHlNIY AM N, ,_ I l/ <li 20()(1.
3m'. -it. fum, 3~ THE MADHYA PRADESH SHASAKIYA SEVAK (ADHIVARSIIIKI-AYl1l SANSHODHAN ADHINIY AM, 2000.
!Received the assent of the Governor on 31st May, 2000; assent first puhlishcd in the ",\laclll\.i l'rncksh c;ai (Extra-ordinar,r, dated the 14th June, 2000.]
An Act further to amend the l\fadhya Pradesh Shasakiya Scvak ( Aclhi, a,·shiki-,\ Adhiniyam, 1967.
Be it enacted by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature in the Fifty of India as follows :- Short title and I. (I) This Act may he called the Madhya Pradesh Shasakiya Sevak ( J\dhivarshiki-A commencement. Sanshodhan Adhiniyam, 2000.
Amendment of Fundamental Ruic 56 as suhstitnted hy Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Act No. 29 of 1967.
(2) It shall he deemed to have come into force with effect from the I :st January. 2000.
2. In Section 2 of the Madhya Pradesh Sha_c;akiya Sevak (Adhivarshiki-J\yui Adhi1m;_ 1967 (No. 29 of 1967), for clause (a) of suh-rulc (2) of Ruic 5(1 ,lf the Fundamental Ruic,. I following ctau_c;e shall he subslitutcd. namely :- "(a) A Government servant may. in the public interest. be retired at any t,mc ;tllcf has completed 20 years qu<1tifying service, or he attains the age of fifty vca whichever is earlier, without assigning any reason by giving him a 11\ll 111 writing.".
Chhattisgarh Shaskiya Sevak (Adhivarshiki-Ayu) Adhiniyam, 1967. No.29 of 1967 Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 Page 5 Page 6 Page 7 Page 8 Page 9 Page 10 CG Shasakiya Sevak (adhivarshiki-ayu) Sansodhan Adhiniyam, 2000, Act No.19 Of 2000,31-05-2000